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1.

Background

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of
Africa1 has exacerbated conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Sudan, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville
Brazzaville and elsewhere in the region. Small arms availability has also
aggravated the degree of violence by increasing the lethality and duration of hostilities, and the
resulting culture of violence has obstructed peace efforts and delayed the launching of economic
and social recovery in post-war
war societies in the region.
region. Until very recently, governments in the
region have lacked the capacity to deal with illicit supplies and trafficking, and even now, their
capacity is limited. The lack of alternative livelihoods for those who are involved in armed
groups, as well as general
eneral insecurity, have meant that individuals and groups are reluctant to
surrender the weapons in their possession.
A conference in Nairobi in March 2000 for ten countries from the Horn and Great Lakes sub
subregions resulted in the Nairobi Declaration (ND),
(ND), whereby the signatories undertook to share
information and co-operate
operate in matters relating to illicit small arms and light weapons and to
exercise effective control over the possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons. In
order to support implementation
mplementation of the Nairobi Declaration, as well as the DRC peace process,
the Small Arms and Demobilization Unit (SADU) of UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and
Recovery (BCPR) established the GLR Small Arms Regional Programme (SARP) in January
2002. The programme aims to build awareness of the problem of small arms proliferation in the
Great Lakes within UNDP and its partners in the region, enhancing understanding of the impact
on longer term development, integrating responses to the problem into UNDP’
UNDP’s longer term
programming and developing specific projects to tackle small arms proliferation.
Since its inception, changing realities in the region have influenced the direction of the project.
The original project concept was heavily focused on the conflict
conflict in DRC and its impact in the
surrounding region, but lack of progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
in DRC created few opportunities for concrete activities. More recently, however, the deployment
of the UN Organization Mission
ion to Congo (MONUC), the commencement of the DDRRR
programme, and the involvement of donors in the Multi-Country
Multi Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Programme (MDRP) has created a window of opportunity in the region, while at
the same time increasing the number
num
of actors and thus international co-ordination.
ordination. SARP’s role
within these processes with respect to SALW activities still remains unclear. Furthermore, the
gradual operationalization of the Nairobi Secretariat (NS) during 2003 has created a serious
regional
gional partner through which SARP’s regional participation could be enhanced.
2.

Assessment Process

The initial project foresaw monitoring and evaluation throughout project implementation, but
there has been little systematic monitoring since mid-2002
mid
and no assessment or evaluation
during the entire project. An internal assessment is therefore long overdue, and is considered
particularly desirable in view of political developments in the region, the emergence of key
partners, and the need to review progress
progress made so far. Furthermore, the current project is due
to end in December 2004, and assessment will help with strategic planning on the way ahead.
This preliminary assessment has constrained itself to taking stock of progress achieved and
challenges identified
entified so far, and to the development of limited recommendations for the future of
1

For the purpose of this project, the Great Lakes Region has been defined as all the countries directly involved in the
DRC conflict and the countries that suffer impact of the DRC conflict through refugees, increased cross-border
cross
trafficking and violence.
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the project, both for the remainder of the year and in a possible second phase. Terms of
reference can be found at Annex 2
2.
The purpose of assessment can be summarized as follows:
 The identification of tangible achievements;
 The identification of options for SARP’s future direction.
Originally a full external impact evaluation was considered, but this is no longer considered
necessary at this stage for reasons outlined in Section 9. However, an independent impact
evaluation involving the Regional Bureau could still be useful at the end of the current project, if
combined with a needs assessment.
The BCPR/SADU Regional Liaison Specialist, Kate Joseph, conducted an assessment mission
to Nairobi during the period 16-17
16
March and 26 March – 1 April 2004. The assessment
methodology included the following elements:
 Interviews with stakeholders;
 Interviews with other partners;
 Interviews with all current SARP staff and one former staff member;
 Interviews with UNDP Kenya country office;
 Questionnaire distributed to UNDP country offices in the region (replies only received
from Tanzania and Burundi);
 Review of project documentation and reports;
 Review
ew of project finances.
This report reviews SARP’s progress against its stated objectives, but also identifies key
successes, obstacles, areas for improvement and options for the future. It does not provide a
systematic record of all of SARP’s activities,
activities, as these can be found in SARP’s own reports, but
rather highlights certain activities where it is felt that these have contributed to the realisation of
objectives or generation of lessons learned. Recommendations can be found in Section 9.
3.

Mandate and start-up

3.1
Mandate
As previously explained, SARP was originally established to tackle small arms proliferation
arising from the DRC conflict, and, as such, was heavily focused on the DRC and the
surrounding countries affected by the conflict. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the overriding goal and the
objectives outlined in the project document are considerably broader in scope. As defined in the
project document, SARP’s goal is “to reduce the humanitarian and development impact of small
arms proliferation and availability
ility in the Great Lakes Region”,
Region”, and the four objectives were listed
as follows:
1. Integrate development related aspects of small arms problems into agreed international
development community policies and development programmes in the Great Lakes;
2. Raise national
tional and international awareness of the humanitarian impact, and wider socio
socioeconomic and development costs of small arms problems in the Great Lakes;
3. Strengthen the capacity of country programmes in the Great Lakes region to understand
and analyse small arms proliferation and respond;
4. Design and implement country and regional programmes in the Great Lakes to address
small arms proliferation.
In spite of these rather general objectives, the programme has largely been seen through the
lens of the DRC conflict.
lict. As a result, slow institutional processes in the transition phase on the
4

DRC side were seen as an obstacle for implementation across the board for SARP. Faced with
these difficulties, SARP has shifted its emphasis from the impact of the DRC conflic
conflict to other
processes in the region during the last year, but has not sought to redefine SARP’s goals or
developed flexible annual strategies or workplans to guide this process.
3.2
Establishment of the programme
SARP was designed to run for a three-year
three year period, starting in January 2002, but due to
difficulties with the recruitment process the programme was not begun until May 2002.
Recruitment continued even after this date so that the programme was not fully operational
ope
until
at least half a year after the intended start date. As a result, activities were also delayed. The
SARP team also faced a number of challenges in establishing a functioning project office (see
Section 8), which set the programme back still further. It would perhaps be fair to say SARP was
not able to launch programme activities until at least eight to nine months after the anticipated
start date.
In the early phase of the project, a regional assessment was conducted which was to form the
basis of planning and programming for the next three years. The regional assessment was a
useful document but difficulties between the assessment team, BCPR and some country offices
in the region undermined the value of the initiative and reduced the quality
quality of the final document.
The failure of the assessment team leader to fulfil the terms of his contract was particularly
damaging. Furthermore, it is possible that a number of personal and institutional relationships
suffered as a result of this exercise
exercise and created problems for the project later on.
Following the development of the regional assessment, a BCPR/SADU mission was fielded to
Nairobi to assist the team with the development of a strategy and workplan, and to provide some
orientation and training
ining for the staff. Again, this was useful and helped create a framework for
future activities. However, the development of both the Project Document and the Strategy could
be seen as a top-down
down approach in which a vision was imposed from headquarters w
without
sufficient input from the region, in part due to the delay in the production of the final report from
the regional assessment because of the difficulties outlined above. The Strategy also created a
workplan for UNDP as a whole, and did not differen
differentiate
tiate between SARP, Country Offices and
BCPR. As a result, the relevance of the Strategy was called into question and was largely
ignored in the day-to-day
day programming and planning of the regional programme. As a result,
and as will shown below, SARP’s approach
approach to programming and implementation has largely
been ad hoc and opportunistic in nature.
3.3
Scope
In terms of geographical scope, the regional programme was developed to cover the countries
affected by the DRC conflict, which were taken to comprise Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Uganda, Republic of Congo (RoC) and Tanzania. The Central African
Republic is not formally part of the project but nevertheless features prominently in the Strategy.
Kenya was not considered part of the project,
project, even though the programme is based in Nairobi.
This has been a source of some confusion, and has prevented SARP from capitalizing on
progress made in Kenya on small arms control, both by UNDP and by other organizations.
Meanwhile, interaction with other
her players focusing on the Great Lakes region, including donors,
has sometime been difficult due to the fact that they more often operate from Kinshasa. Lastly,
SARP’s geographical scope does not fit with that of the Nairobi Declaration, which includes
Sudan,
udan, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea, but does not include RoC. This has also created
difficulties for SARP in its support to the Nairobi Secretariat, one of its mandated activities.
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However, these difficulties should not be overstated, and in general,
general, workable solutions have
been or could be found.
4.

Overall impact

Before delving into progress made against objectives, it is useful to look at the overall picture in
the region and the views of key partners and stakeholders.
4.1
Overall benefit to the
he region
During discussions, key partners identified the following elements as evidence of SARP’s overall
benefit to the region:
 Mainstreaming small arms issue in humanitarian frameworks;
 Capacity development among NGOs and civil society organizations;
 Parliamentary process;
 Support for the Nairobi Secretariat and Friends of the Nairobi Declaration;
 Technical advice and assistance to country offices (where provided).
Most identified awareness raising to be the most visible benefit brought by the project, and spoke
positively about the events organized by SARP in this regard. Capacity building with NGOs and
CSOs was also considered to be of value for the region, including through the DRC workshop
and the Training of Trainers workshop organized by Saferworld
Saferworld and BCPR, with SARP support.
Many partners considered the process of engagement with parliamentarians to be particularly
innovative and useful, and cited it as clear evidence of SARP’s value added. SARP’s support to
the Nairobi Secretariat staff through
throug a one-week
week orientation course, as well as its co
cochairmanship of the Friends of the Nairobi Declaration (FND) was considered to have been
useful, although it was felt that more could be done here.
Rather more intangibly, the regional nature of the programme
programme was thought by many to be of
benefit to the region. Regional processes such as the parliamentary dialogue or the Training of
Trainers workshop have an important confidence building impact that goes far beyond the control
of small arms. The mere fact
ct that representatives (be they non-governmental,
non governmental, governmental or
parliamentary) from previously hostile countries have been able to sit down together and discuss
highly sensitive issues can be considered an achievement in itself. Some partners highlight
highlighted
this affect as SARP’s main benefit for the region, although it is perhaps not a central goal for the
project.
4.2
Political challenges
There is no doubt that SARP has been operating in a difficult and challenging environment, both
in logistical and political terms. These have presented considerable problems, some of which
SARP has been able to overcome, but most of which have severely hampered
hampered its capacity to
deliver planned outputs effectively.
Continuing volatility and instability in the Great Lakes region make activities on small arms and
light weapons difficult and sometimes even dangerous to implement. However, moves towards
peace in a number of countries in the region have created a number of opportunities in the last
year. Nevertheless, a lack of political will among governments of the region remains a major
stumbling block, especially for initiatives at country level. Increased sensitization has gone some
way towards addressing this problem, and the efforts of the Nairobi Secretariat have also proved
useful in this regard.
6

5.

Progress against objectives

The project document included a few indicators against which to measure progress
progress in meeting
the objectives.
5.1

First objective
Integrate development related aspects of small arms problems into agreed international
development community policies and development programmes in the Great Lakes.
Indicators of success:
 Adoption of National and Regional small arms policies.
 Policies of UN System for the Great Lakes Region formulated in the context of inter
interagency mechanisms such as CASA, IASC, etc.
 National Strategies or small arms reduction plans developed in at least four countri
countries
in the Great Lakes Region.

Overall, significant process has been made in the region towards the agreement of small arms
policies and the integration of the issue into policy frameworks. Within the context of this
assessment, it is difficult to assess how far this can be attributed to SARP and how much the
efforts of other organizations have contributed to this process.
A number of countries in the region have moved closer towards the development of small arms
policies and action plans, largely in ord
order
er to implement commitments undertaken within the
framework of the Nairobi Declaration. Most ND signatories have established national focal
points and some have begun to develop national action plans. In this, they have received
considerable support from Saferworld, SaferAfrica and SRIC, through a grant provided by the
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID); SARP has not played a substantial role
in these processes. However, SARP has provided support and assistance to the Nairobi
Secretariat through the provision of some training and advice. This has been a useful
complement to the support provided by the two NGOs and has been viewed positively by the NS.
There is a desire within the NS to continue this relationship.
Although SARP cannot be said
aid to have fully achieved this rather ambitious objective, the
programme has had some success in mainstreaming the small arms issue into planning
processes of other UN agencies, notably OCHA. Here, SARP succeeded in integrating the small
arms issue into the contingency planning process co-ordinated
co ordinated by OCHA, and was able to
include small arms control as a priority issue within the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).
Although this latter achievement did not help SARP mobilize resources, it may have helped
increase awareness of the small arms issue, both within the UN family and among donors.
However, much of the progress made under this objective has been opportunistic in nature, and
is not the result of a coherent strategy. Some of the planned outputs did not take place, such as
the organization of a regional UNDP country office workshop to review best practice and distil
lessons learned. This may be because country offices in the region were not always receptive to
SARP’s advances, but a more concerte
concerted
d approach might have helped generate interest among
UNDP CO staff. A focus away from lessons learned, which was perhaps premature, and
towards training, awareness raising and capacity development, might have helped in this regard.
The development of materials
erials such as operational guidelines would certainly also have been
helpful, but this did not take place.
7

5.2

Second objective
Raise national and international awareness of the humanitarian impact, and wider socio
socioeconomic and development costs of small arms problems in the Great Lakes.
Indicators of success:
(1) Small Arms and Light Weapons issues related to GLR featuring in national and
international media.
(2) National awareness strategies developed and implemented in four countries in GLR.
(3) Broad-based government
ment programmes initiated, featuring multi-sectoral
multi sectoral approaches

There is little doubt that awareness of the humanitarian impact of small arms and light weapons
has increased substantially in the Great Lakes region, but again it is difficult to differentiat
differentiate
between the impact of SARP and that of other organizations working on the issue. Saferworld,
for example, has done much to increase awareness among government officials, and the impact
of the ND and the strenuous diplomatic efforts of the NS in recent months
months should not be
forgotten.
It is probably fair to say, however, that SARP’s activities have contributed to increased
awareness, especially among policy circles and among national non-governmental
non governmental organizations
(NGOs). One of SARP’s key activities, the
the regional media workshop held in Nairobi from 28
28-30
April 2003, seems to have had a significant impact on media reporting on the small arms issue,
and helped generate media attention towards the issue. However, it was not possible to conduct
a systematic review of media activity during this assessment.
SARP has focused on the development of awareness among civil society and has proved adept
at identifying civil society partners, in the form of NGOs, CSOs and parliamentarians. Additional
activities that have helped meet this objective include the civil society training workshop for DRC,
held in Kinshasa from 28-39
39 May 2003 and organized with the Congolese NGO Groupe d’Action
pour las Démobilisation et la Réinsertion des Enfants Soldats de la RDC (GADERES
(GADERES). This
workshop helped build a civil society network in DRC that will become useful as the country
programme moves into an operational phase, but it was not possible to support activities that
built on the event in its immediate aftermath.
Finally, SARP has pursued a strategy to raise awareness among parliamentarians of the
problems posed by small arms proliferation. A workshop co-organized
co organized with the European
Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) in Mombasa in November 2003 went surprisingly well, and
helped
d generate considerable political will among parliamentarians for tighter arms control
legislation (both domestic and external). More importantly, perhaps, it provided an opportunity
for policy-makers
makers from across the region to sit down together for the first
first time; the value of such
an event in terms of confidence building and peacemaking should not be underestimated.
Opportunities have arisen that will allow SARP to build on progress made in Mombasa, such as
the AWEPA-organized
organized meeting for parliamentarians from Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, held in
Bujumbura from 29-30
30 March 2004. National initiatives will now be crucial in order to translate
commitment into action.
A number of other outputs have been developed that help contribute to the realization of this
objective, including the production of brochures, t-shirts,
t shirts, stickers and a SARP logo. However,
some other outputs which might have reached a wider audience have not
not materialized, such as a
SARP newsletter and a SARP website, although SARP does contribute articles to the Nairobi
8

Secretariat newsletter. One destruction event that was organized by the Kenyan government
with the support of UNDP to mark the anniversary of the first Ministerial Review Conference of
the Nairobi Declaration helped generate some attention in Kenya, but no other destruction
events have been organized by the programme in the region.
There have been some successes in meeting this objective, but
but again, SARP’s activities have
largely been ad hoc. Although SARP has created a strategy for communications and
sensitization, activities have been relatively sporadic, usually consisting of one event in one
country or at the regional level, and there h
has been little systematic follow-up.
up. Furthermore,
although awareness may have been raised among political elites, relatively little has been done
at community level or with the general public. It is difficult not to conclude that opportunities have
been missed.
issed. In general, it would perhaps be fair to say that SARP has made progress on the
first indicator, but there is little evidence of any progress on the second and third indicators.
5.3

Third objective
Strengthen the capacity of country programmes in the Great Lakes region to understand
and analyse small arms proliferation and respond.
Indicators of Success:
(1) Development impact of small arms proliferation successfully incorporated by UNDP
Country Offices in the region into various UN planning tool such as CCA, UNDAF,
UNDP Country Reviews, etc at least in 4 countries.
(2) SALW mainstreamed in UNDP and other donor operations in the region.
(3) Nationally agreed small arms assessments developed.

Much of the focus of the original project document has been
been on the creation of national small
arms programmes through the UNDP Country Offices (COs) in the region. This assumed a
certain level of interest and commitment on the part of these COs, which was in many cases
difficult to sustain.
Some progress has been made against the first indicator. For example, SARP supported the
inclusion of small arms control within the Kenya UN Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF), which is a significant achievement that has proved to be a challenge els
elsewhere. In
the Burundi CO, small arms have also been included in the UNDAF, probably as a result of
SARP’s awareness raising activities if not its advocacy. Naturally, in order to reap the full benefit
of such mainstreaming, SARP and others will need to continue to highlight the issue and to
capitalize on its inclusion in UNDP programming structures.
In terms of the second indicator of success, little progress has been made. However, it should
be stressed that this was perhaps somewhat unrealistic given
given the relatively infancy of the small
arms issue within UNDP and other development organizations. Furthermore, policy is often
agreed at headquarters level so policy changes could only be relatively limited at the regional
level. Nevertheless, it seems that
that more could have been done in order to help meet this
objective, especially through increased liaison and interaction with COs, and through the
organization of awareness raising or capacity building workshops for CO staff.
The project document envisaged
envisaged that SARP would conduct a number of assessments at the
regional and country level that were intended to build the basis for future programming. A
regional assessment was conducted at the outset of the programme, but this was organized by
BCPR before SARP
P was fully operational, and therefore cannot be considered an output of the
9

regional programme. Some project formulation missions have been conducted by the SARP
team in Rwanda, Western Tanzania, DRC, and Burundi, as well as numerous project formulation
missions to Republic of Congo (RoC). These have no doubt been valuable, but few concrete
results have materialised. The reasons for this may be numerous and are too complex to
explore within the framework of this assessment, but again, a lack of sustained interest on the
part of most UNDP country offices is certainly a contributing factor.
What is unfortunate is that SARP did not undertake small arms assessments in any of the
countries covered by the programme; such assessments might have helped increas
increase
understanding of the small arms issue among UNDP staff and could have provided evidence to
justify small arms interventions. It should be noted, however, that the situation in some countries
(e.g. DRC, Burundi) was not stable enough for assessments to take place. At this stage,
Saferworld/SaferAfrica have conducted mapping exercises in a number of countries in the region
that may or may not be useful substitutes for such assessments. At the very least, it would be
useful to build on the work done by Saferworld
Saferworld in this regard, assuming Saferworld’s agreement
could be secured.
Finally, some assessments on aspects of policy would also have been of benefit for future
programming. For example, a SARP project was designed to support field and inter-agency
inter
collaboration
ollaboration among customs agencies, but it never came to fruition in spite of considerable
donor interest. The project was certainly unrealistic and needed considerable revision; a
planned assessment would have helped in this regard. It is unfortunate that
that an opportunity was
not found to move this project forward, and to conduct similar assessments on other aspects of
small arms policy.
5.4

Fourth objective
Design and implement country and regional programmes in the Great Lakes to address
small arms proliferation.
Indicators of Success:
(1) A significant number of UNDP projects addressing small arms proliferation issues
successfully developed.
(2) Considerable number of weapons collected and destroyed with UNDP support.
(3) Reducing significantly the direct and indirect impacts of small arms proliferation and
availability on human development in the areas of support.

It is not entirely from the outputs listed under this objective in the project document whether the
focus here was limited to DRC and the countries impacted by the DRC conflict, or it is intended
to cover all countries of the region and aspects of the small arms problem. Whichever is the
case, SARP is only now able to make a substantial contribution to the formulation of national
UNDP country programmes
mmes on small arms, with the exception of Republic of Congo, where
SARP assisted in the drafting of three project documents, of which one was eventually funded by
the EU. SARP has had recent successes with the development of a pilot phase country project iin
Western Tanzania and the development of a workplan for the small arms component of the DRC
Community Recovery project. SARP is also advising the Burundi CO on the development of a
national project.
However, in general, progress has been slow and hamp
hampered
ered by the involvement of other actors
and the nature of political processes in the region. In DRC and RoC, the development of a
national DDR strategy and the involvement of the World Bank through the MDRP respectively
10

have made it difficult to develop low-level
l
level small arms projects of a pilot nature that might have
been useful to test approaches and generate lessons learned. Therefore it seems fair to say that
the indicators of success have not been reached and this project objective has not been met.
However,
wever, opportunities now exist to make significant progress on the first indicator, and SARP
could build on progress made in DRC and Western Tanzania to develop similar pilot initiatives
elsewhere.
6.

UNDP relationships

6.1
Headquarters support
As outlined above, BCPR/SADU played the central role in drafting the project document and the
original Strategy document. SADU later provided some training and orientation to the SARP
staff, which was considered useful, and continued to provide backstopping
backstopping and technical advice
to the programme. However, there do appear to have been some difficulties in the relationship
with SADU. SARP staff felt that the training provided was inadequate; it is also the view of this
assessment that all programme staff would
would have benefited from more training and capacity
building on the substantive issues, project management, communications and capacity
development, as well as on UNDP procedures and practices.
There was also a perception from some staff that SADU support had been sporadic. At times,
SADU played a strong role in the development of the project and perhaps tried to direct the
project from Geneva, which was understandable given SARP’s limited capacity at the time, but
the manner in which this was done certainly
certainly caused disagreements with SARP project staff. On
the other hand, there was a long period (almost one year) when SADU did not provide any
support to SARP due to changes in staffing. At least one monitoring visit should have taken
place in 2003. In general,
ral, this points to a need for more consistent support from SADU.
The Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) was substantially involved in the design of the Document
through the provision of technical assistance and input, and through the provision of USD
100,000
00 from TRAC 2 funds. RBA’s involvement was no doubt instrumental in the early phase
and helped ensure complementarity with UNDP’s programming in the Great Lakes region.
However, later on during the implementation, RBA was no longer centrally involved. In view of
the highly political nature of the work undertaken by SARP and the complexities of the region, it
would be wise to bring RBA back into the discussion about SARP’s future.
6.2
Country Offices
One of SARP’s primary aims was the development of national
national projects in the countries of the
region. Progress made under this objective has been outlined above, but the relationship with the
UNDP COs warrants further examination. In general, interest displayed by UNDP COs in the
regional programme has been sporadic
sporadic at best, perhaps because there has been little financial
incentive. Only two country offices responded to the questionnaire prepared for this assessment.
Democratic Republic of Congo: Relations with the DRC CO were often difficult, due in part tto the
sheer scale of activities and support that was needed in the country. Furthermore, the
involvement of major international players in DRC, such as the World Bank in DDR activities and
the subsequent establishment of the MDRP complicated relations and made progress slow.
However, these relations have now improved significantly with the fielding of a SARP/SADU
mission to Eastern DRC in recent weeks, and SARP is committed to the provision of key inputs
to the DRC Community Recovery project.
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Republic of Congo: A strong relationship was established early on with the RoC CO, and SARP
fielded a number of technical assistance missions to provide input into the development of small
arms and DDR projects. The SARP programme officer was detailed to the Brazzaville
Brazzav
office for a
period of one month to provide backstopping for the development of the national DDRRR
programme. SARP also made a provisional commitment to provide seed funding of USD
150,000 to the RoC CO for a cross-border
cross
project on Community Recovery,, Weapons Collection
and the Repatriation and Reintegration of DRC Ex-combatants.
Ex combatants. SARP also transferred an
additional USD 142,000 for a DDR advisor. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to either
programme the USD 150,000, and the CO was disappointed with
with the SARP and BCPR’s inability
to identify suitable candidates for the DDR post. However, agreement has recently been reached
between SARP and the CO on this issue.
Burundi: Two missions to Burundi were conducted relatively early on in the project and some
backstopping and technical advice was provided. The Burundi CO also managed to integrate
small arms into the UNDAF with SARP support, although in the absence of a Resident
Representative for some time little attention was paid to the issue. No concrete
concrete activities were
undertaken, although it is arguable that the situation was not ripe for an intervention at this stage.
Again, the situation improved with the arrival of a new RR, and a planned Gender, Small Arms
and DDR workshop and assessment, which may well create the opportunity for a broader based
pilot project. Care should be taken to ensure complementary with BCPR/ Transitional Recovery
Unit’s activities on reintegration.
Uganda: SARP has not initiated any activities in Uganda. There is a perceived
perceived lack of interest
on the part of the government in the small arms impacts of the DRC conflict, while the UNDP CO
has not so far focused on problems related to the Karamojong and the LRA in Northern Uganda.
These were seen by SARP as falling outside the
the mandate of the original project document,
although the cross-border
border dimensions of these issues would lend themselves well to SARP
intervention. Opportunities for engagement could also arise as a result of the upcoming BCPR
mission.
Rwanda: Technical assistance
sistance missions have been fielded to Rwanda but as yet no concrete
activities have been developed. There is a perception within SARP that other international actors
in the country are playing a leading role and that there is a little for SARP to contribu
contribute. Mixed
messages have also been received from different government authorities on the Small Arms
situation. Here, an assessment could be useful in identifying ideas for pilot projects.
Tanzania: In the early stages, SARP did not focus on Tanzania, in part because Saferworld and
SaferAfrica were very active in the country already. However, an opportunity for UNDP
involvement was identified in Kigoma, and SARP has provided technical assistance and advice
for the design of a small arms project in Western Tanzania using a development focused
community based weapons recovery approach.
7.

Partnerships

There is a variety of organizations and actors active on small arms issues in the Great Lakes
region and SARP has established partnerships with a number of these.
these. However, the multiplicity
of actors and the various approaches used has sometimes created a complicated picture within
which SARP has often struggled to find its niche. A division of labour among the different
organizations has not been established,
established, and SARP could have done more to highlight its value
added and comparative advantage on small arms programming within a development
perspective.
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7.1
Nairobi Secretariat
During its first two years of operation, the Nairobi Secretariat (NS) was not fully operational and
lacked the capacity, and indeed the political will, to take a more proactive approach to
implementation of the Nairobi Declaration. In the last year, however, the arrival of a new Co
Coordinator has signalled a new era in the NS’s work. The
The Secretariat has been reasonably
successful in bringing governments of the region on board, and has supported the creation of 7
out of the 10 National Focal Points. Furthermore, the Secretariat has secured new funding for the
next three-year period to 2007.
7. The Secretariat has received considerable technical assistance
from Saferworld, and, to a lesser extent, from SARP. However, the Secretariat’s capacity
development needs are still great, particularly in terms of staff development and training. SARP
has
as also provided support to the Friends of the Nairobi Declaration (FND) group, although the
group has functioned more as an information exchange mechanism than as a resource and
project mobilization forum. SARP could usefully help reinvigorate the FND by bringing projects
and issues to its attention.
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why a stronger relationship between SARP and the
NS may not be feasible at this time. First, as previously explained, the Secretariat has received
considerable support
ort from Saferworld and SaferAfrica in terms of capacity building and
programming, and these two organizations are named implementers as per the terms of the
Secretariat’s DFID grant. Since DFID is also one of SARP’s main funders, and SARP is also
mandated
d to support the NS, it would have been useful if DFID’s funding strategy had insisted on
better co-ordination
ordination with SARP. Secondly, SARP’s objectives and target countries differ
substantially from those of the Nairobi Secretariat. However, there may be sco
scope for cooperation on project related activities, where the political input of the Nairobi Secretariat could be
useful in discussions with governments. The FND could also be used for resource mobilization
and awareness raising.
7.2
Governments
Very limited
ited contacts have been established with governments of the region. There may be
three valid reasons for this. First, UNDP should liaise with governments primarily through the
COs. Secondly, the Nairobi Secretariat maintains contacts with government on issues related to
small arms control. Thirdly, international NGOs have somewhat “cornered the market” in the
provision of technical advice and assistance to governments (see below). However, there is a
strong case for enhanced SARP interaction with governments
governments if the programme is to be able to
launch pilot projects and achieve sustainability in programming. Regular courtesy calls to
National Co-ordinators
ordinators for small arms and National Focal Points would be useful when SARP
staff travel on missions. Discussions
sions with government officials during the design of pilot projects
are also essential. Both should be facilitated through UNDP country offices.
7.3
Non-governmental
governmental organizations
The relationship with Saferworld (SW) and its sister organization SaferAfrica
SaferAfrica (SA) deserves
special attention since they are major players on small arms control in the region. Both
organizations have focused their activities on co-operation
co operation with governments, in particular
through training, capacity development and the provision of technical assistance for legislative
drafting. The approach taken by these organizations differs substantially from that of SARP,
which perceives it to lean too much towards a one-size-fits-all
one
all top down approach. While the
various merits or drawbacks of SW/SA’s approach are not a subject of this assessment, the
differing approaches have sometime brought the two sides into conflict.

13

Both organizations are extremely active in the region and provide substantial support to both
governments and the Nairobi
bi Secretariat. At times, SARP and UNDP in general are unsure
where they contribute, and, as one interviewee noted, “UNDP is in danger of becoming an
implementing agency for Saferworld”. SARP has established a productive relationship with
Saferworld, partly
tly as a result of the Training of Trainers workshop and through contact
maintained at the headquarters, but also through some contacts made by SARP itself. This is a
positive development, but a clear division of labour needs to be established with SW/SA. In
particular, SARP should focus on those aspects in which it has a comparative advantage,
especially development focused approaches to small arms control, operational small arms
control projects at the country level, and community based capacity development.
development.
There are also a number of national NGOs working on small arms control in the region. As part
of its capacity development mandate, SARP has provided some training and capacity building to
national NGOs, but has not been able to provide direct funding
funding for projects. Therefore, SARP’s
capacity to use the expertise and knowledge available within national NGOs has been limited.
Although SARP should not become a donor for NGOs, it could consider providing limited seed
funding for projects developed in conjunction
conjunction with national NGOs where the projects will
contribute to attainment of SARP’s regional objectives, or where approaches could be tested
nationally for replication at a regional level.
7.4
UN Family
The regional programme has maintained contacts with a number of UN agencies and
programmes. Relations with the Office for the Co-ordination
Co ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and
the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have been particularly strong, and ha
have
focused on mainstreaming and on operational co-operation.
co operation. SARP has also had some contact
with both UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
although there have been no joint activities to date. Given SARP’s mainstreaming
mainstreaming mandate it is
unfortunate that stronger links have not been established with these two critical organizations,
although this can often be a challenging process.
Some contact has been established with the Office to the Special Representative of th
the
Secretary General (SRSG) for the Great Lakes conflict, and SARP staff members have
participated in preparatory meetings for the Great Lakes Peace Conference. This forum offers a
number of opportunities for awareness raising and advocacy on small arms co
control and
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); SARP could seize these opportunities in
the next few months by organizing a side event at the first conference meeting and by preparing
briefing materials and brochures for dissemination.
8.

Management
anagement and administration

8.1
Management
The SARP project team faced a number of challenges during the establishment of the
programme, some of which they were able to overcome through key successes. Foremost
among these has been the establishment of a functioning project unit in Nairobi, in spite of the
fact that there were no established procedures to follow, and the fact that no provision had been
made in the project document for operating costs. When the project document was developed, it
was assumed
d that the Kenya CO would be able to cover these costs but this was never
discussed in detail between the CO and BCPR. Nevertheless, the SARP staff dealt with this
situation well and was able to establish a functioning office relatively quickly.
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The project
ect team also established good relations with the Kenya CO, which has been helpful with
a number of aspects of the project. Political support from the Resident Representative has been
particularly beneficial. There have, however, been some difficulties on
on the logistical side, partly
because the CO had no experience with the establishment of regional programmes, and
therefore had no established procedures for SARP to follow. This has been overcome through
time, but administrative issues have persisted. In particular, SARP has found that procedures
such as travel authorizations or residency applications have taken longer than expected due to
delays at the CO.
SARP project management has suffered from the fact that little training and support was offered
to the team, and, in particular to the Project Co-ordinator.
Co
The Project Co-ordinator
ordinator had little
project management experience and no experience with the practices and procedures of UNDP.
At the same time, the project brought together a diverse group of people
people from different
backgrounds, which made interaction and communication challenging.
As a result, there have been a number of difficulties in the management of the project. These fall
into three main categories: strategic planning, information sharing and communication. First and
foremost among these has been the overall lack of strategic direction and planning. Although
the Project Document and Strategy became less relevant over time, little effort was made to
follow annual workplans. Those workpla
workplans
ns that were developed did not retain sufficient flexibility
to allow the Project Team to respond to opportunities as they arose or modify activities to suit the
changing environment. As a result, workplans themselves also lost their relevance, and SARP
operated
erated in a more ad hoc and opportunistic manner. SARP’s activities became largely reactive
in nature and did not fit into an overall strategy. This then had a knockknock-on effect on the
management of staff in the team, where the absence of a clear workplan m
made it difficult to
create a workable division of labour among the staff. Although the Project Co
Co-ordinator
endeavoured to delineate staff responsibilities, activities were not fully co-ordinated,
co ordinated, which often
led to overlaps, gaps, and worse, a competitive
competitiv atmosphere in the office.
Information sharing and communication has also been a particular problem for the project team,
although the Project Co-ordinator
ordinator did establish procedures such as regular staff meetings. The
perception was that Information was not shared properly both between the Project Co
Co-ordinator
and the staff members, and among the staff members themselves. Members of staff often
worked in isolation on different projects without keeping team members adequately informed,
with the result thatt projects stalled when staff left.
Ultimately, the responsibility for intra-office
intra office communication, information sharing and strategising
lies with the Project Co-ordinator,
ordinator, who is in charge of establishing procedures and practices that
the staff must follow
ow in the daily work. It is clear that the Project Co-ordinator
Co ordinator would have
benefited from some management and teambuilding training at an early stage. Furthermore,
guidelines on all aspects of project management would have been useful for the entire team.
8.2
Personnel
Personnel issues have presented particular problems for SARP. As explained above, the staff
recruited to the project had only very limited UN and project management experience; they also
had relatively little experience in their respective specialisations. In the absence of clear
direction from the Project Co--ordinator,
ordinator, some staff struggled to perform their tasks in a
challenging environment.
High staff turnover has plagued SARP since the earliest months and has contributed to a lack of
continuity in activities. Part of the reason for both this and the relative lack of experience among
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staff members is the nature of staff contracts: all international staff apart from the Project Co
Coordinator are UN Volunteers (UNVs), and can be easily tempted
tempted away to more senior and better
paid jobs. However, discontent among staff has also been a motivating factor. Clearer
responsibilities and more formalized management structures might help overcome some of these
difficulties.
SARP’s current staffing situation is not ideal. The Communications and Awareness Raising
Officer is leaving at the end of May , but will be now replaced as new funds have been freed up.
The Capacity Building Officer was not replaced when the last incumbent left in October 2003 and
the responsibilities of this post were assumed by the Programme Officer.
8.3

Financial management and resource mobilization

8.2.1 Financial management
As previously explained, the original budget for the project was not well conceived and did not
include funds for fundamental operating costs. SARP therefore had to shift funds from other
budget lines and make a number of budget revisions. This was done in accordance with
established procedures and budget revisions on the basis of new allocations were
were always shared
with the Country Office and with BCPR. Although a full audit is beyond the scope of this
assessment, financial management has generally been satisfactory and there are no serious
issues regarding budgetary matters.
However, budget revisions
ons appear to have been reactive in nature to cover immediate needs and
did not follow a clear strategy. Budget projections have been somewhat lacking. As a result, the
programme is now low on funds for projects at this stage, which is unfortunate since several
possibilities for projects have materialised recently.
Another problem is related to responsibility for budget management, which has almost entirely
fallen to the Project Co-ordinator.
ordinator. This has had two effects. First, the Project Co
Co-ordinator has
become involved in the details of financial management, which has perhaps not been the best
use of his time, and should have been the responsibility of the Programme Officer. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, there is a perceived lack of transparency
transparency in the management of
the programme budget; staff members do not have a clear understanding of the resources
available to them for programming in their particular issue areas, and do not have responsibility
for their own budgets. This has prevented programme
programme staff from planning activities in advance,
and has perhaps contributed to the reactive nature of SARP’s work.
8.2.2 Resource mobilization
In terms of resource mobilization, SARP has not suffered any serious problems and has
managed to mobilize adequate
dequate resources for programming. The original proposal was to secure
Belgian funding to cover the entire cost of the programme; in fact, the Belgian pledge for a
project focusing on DRC within a broader regional perspective was the main impetus behind tthe
creation of the programme in the first place. However, it soon become clear that the Belgian
government was in favour of an integrated small arms and recovery project, which meant that
their funds could no longer be used to support the Great Lakes regional
regional programme, by now in
its initial start-up
up phase. Therefore, the Belgian contribution was eventually used for the DRC
Community Recovery project and the funding for the small arms component of that project (USD
980,185 programmable) was channelled through
through SARP as seed funding for DRC. This
management arrangement later proved unworkable, and the funds have now been transferred
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directly to the DRC CO, but it is recommended that SARP keep a close eye on programming and
financial management since responsibility
responsi
for reporting is shared.
The contribution of TRAC 2 funding from the Regional Bureau was an important step in the
inception of the project, but did not ultimately ensure RBA ownership and Country Office
ownership. It also meant that CO decided no
nott to contribute from its own TRAC 1 resources. The
Belgian government provided a separate contribution of around USD 300,000. BCPR made a
commitment to provide the remainder of the funds through the Crisis Prevention and Recovery
(CPR) Thematic Trust Fund
d (TTF), and resources from Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and
Germany (this last being seed funding for RoC) were used. SARP currently has a shortfall of
approximately USD 450,000. A summary of allocations is provided at Annex 1.
9.

Recommendations

General recommendations and conclusions
9.1
This assessment report shows that SARP has faced considerable political and logistical
difficulties during its two years of operation. As a result, there is little doubt that the delivery rate
has been low for a project of this size. There are a number of reasons for this which have been
outlined above and relate to the original programme design, the political situation, the role of
UNDP COs, the involvement of other international
international actors, the management of the programme
and the role of BCPR.
It is the opinion of this assessment that a further impact evaluation would not be worthwhile at
this stage. Although an impact evaluation is always desirable, it is only a valuable tool
to if there
have been sufficient tangible activities on the ground to be appraised. Although SARP has
undertaken a number of activities, these are generally intangible and have focused primarily on
awareness raising and political dialogue.
Concrete activ
activities
ities have been more limited.
Furthermore, given that this is a regional programme, the impact will also be regional in nature,
and thus highly diffused and difficult to measure. Therefore, an evaluation would almost certainly
focus on process rather than
n impact and would therefore be limited to a progress assessment.
Although it would certainly be able to go deeper than this current assessment, it would be difficult
to justify the financial outlay for another assessment round. This need not preclude a more indepth evaluation at a later stage, possibly combined with a needs assessment.
Therefore, this assessment makes the following recommendations for the future:
1.
BCPR/SADU and SARP should draft a detailed workplan for the remaining eight
months of the current project. This workplan should follow the new template and
should programme the necessary resources for each activity. The workplan should be
based on current projected activities for the remainder of the year, as well as ideas
listed under Section 10.
2.
On the basis of this workplan, SARP and BCPR/SADU should revisit SARP’s current
budget projection and resource allocation. Particular attention should be paid to
human resource questions. Although this will be determined by the workplan, it is
recommended
nded that the Programme Officer receive a regular contract and at least one
additional professional staff member be recruited on SSA, either as a UNV or as
national staff.
3.
BCPR/SADU should maintain regular phone and e-mail
e mail contact (at least every two
weeks) with SARP on the implementation of activities outlined in the workplan.
Written reports should be provided to BCPR/SADU every two months.
4.
BCPR/SADU should initiate a consultation process with UNDP COs, RBA, donors
and other stakeholders on needs and gaps in the region.
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5.

BCPR/SADU, in consultation with SARP and RBA, should review the need for a
second phase. Ideas for a potential new phase can be found in Section 11.

9.2
Strategy for May – December 2004
SARP already has a number of activities planned for the rest of 2004, listed below:
1. Follow-up
up to parliamentary consultation process at the country level, especially in DRC.
2. Community Recovery activities in DRC:
a. Training for Community Recovery project staff
b. Small arms baseline assessment in Eastern DRC
3. Activities in Burundi:
a. Gender and small arms assessment and workshop
b. Pilot project on small arms control
4. Activities in Western Tanzania: support to the PA phase project
a. Assistance with development of a communications and/or awareness raising
strategy
tance with capacity development
b. Assistance
A number of additional activities could be considered from the following list (as well as any others
developed by the project itself):
1. Support for UNDP country offices
a. Additional small arms assessment in one other country of the region, e.g. Uganda
b. Workshop for UNDP CO staff on small arms and DDR
c. Pilot project in one country of the region
2. Support for international co
co-operation on small arms
a. Support to the NS and Friends of Nairobi (e.g. DDR information briefing)
b. Advocacy with
th Great Lakes Peace Conference
3. Pilot projects to test regional approaches
a. Assessment of customs and border management capacity in two locations as
preparation for a capacity development project
b. Follow up to the Training of Trainers workshop at the national
national level
9.3
Elements to be considered for a new regional programme
The decision to develop a new regional programme is dependent on an external evaluation, in
accordance with the current Project Document, as well as a brief needs assessment and internal
and
nd external consultation processes. However, should UNDP decide to go ahead with a Phase
II regional programme, this current progress assessment has the following recommendations:
1. Phase II should be more focused and targeted than the current programme. Priority
should be given to current office support and to the provision of seed funding and
technical advice and assistance for country projects. National assessments could form
the basis of such projects. The project could include the same countries, with a focus on
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The Phase II programme should also focus on
building capacity in UNDP COs and within other UN organizations as appropriate.
2. The Phase II programme could include seed funding for pilot projects with a regional or
bi-national
national component, such as the development of capacity for border management and
customs. Such pilot projects could be used to test approaches and develop best practice.
They should focus on interaction and co-ordination
co ordination between two or three countri
countries, rather
than the entire region at once. If successful, they can then be expanded at a later stage.
3. The compilation of lessons learned and best practices was intended to be part of SARP’s
current work, but it has not been possible to fully develop this area.
area. This could be
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included as a central element of Phase II, and could include the development of resource
materials and guidelines for small arms projects and activities. However, it would be
better if SADU were to take the lead on this, with a Phase II regional programme merely
refining materials for the Great Lakes context. The programme could also function as a
clearinghouse for information, but should avoid taking on any co-ordination
co ordination roles.
4. Some continued support could be given to the Nairobi Secretariat,
Secretariat, but this should be
limited to joint project-related
related activities for which the two organizations could mobilize
additional resources if necessary. Further interaction with regional processes is not
generally recommended, but this could be further explored.
exp
5. Any second phase should include a stronger focus on capacity building in DDR.
Institutional capacity on DDR both within and outside UNDP is very limited. A Phase II
regional programme could play a useful role in providing training and materials on DDR
for international organizations, governments and civil society.
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Annex 1:

Allocations

Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund
Donor

Date

Amount in USD

Belgium

13/03/2002

293,176.00

Germany

09/07/2003

142,900.00

Netherlands

13/03/2002

505,500.00

Switzerland

02/04/2002

173,214.00

Switzerland

04/07/2003

245,000.00

UK

05/23/2002

376,676.00

Total

1,1736,466.00

Other allocations: TRAC
Source

Amount in USD

TRAC 1.1.2

100,000.00

Other allocations: Community Recovery in Support of the DRC Peace Process
Donor

Amount in USD

Belgium / Suballotment

980,185.50
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Annex 2:

Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE
BCPR/SADU MISSION TO KENYA
26 March – 1 April 2004

Background
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of
Africa2 has exacerbated conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Sudan, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville
Brazzaville and elsewhere in the region. The proliferation of SALW has
also increased the degree of violence by increasing the lethality and duration of hostilities. The
resulting culture of violence has obstructed peace efforts and delayed the launching of economic
and social recovery in post-war
war societies in the region. Governments in the region have lacked
the capacity
pacity to deal with illicit supplies and trafficking. The lack of alternative livelihoods for those
who are involved in armed groups and the general lack of security, mean people are reluctant to
surrender the weapons they hold.
A conference in Nairobi in March 2000 for 10 countries from the Horn and Great Lakes sub
subregions resulted in the ‘Nairobi Declaration’, whereby the signatories undertook to share
information and co-operate
operate in matters relating to illicit small arms and light weapons and to
exercise effective control over the possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons. In
order to support implementation of the Nairobi Declaration, as well as the DRC peace process,
BCPR/SADU established the GLR Small Arms Regional Programme (SARP) in Jan
January 2002.
The Programme aims to build awareness of the problem of small arms proliferation in the Great
Lakes within UNDP and its partners in the region, enhancing understanding of the impact on
longer term development, integrating responses to the problem
problem into UNDP’s longer term
programming and developing specific projects to tackle small arms proliferation.
Since its inception, changing realities in the region have influenced the direction of the project.
The signature of a global peace accord in DRC, the subsequent deployment of MONUC, the
commencement of the DDRRR programme, and the involvement of donors in the Multi
Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) has created a window of opportunity in
the region, while at the same time increasing
increasing the number of actors and thus international co
coordination. SARP’s role within these processes, and the part to be played by small arms
activities, still remain unclear. Furthermore, the gradual operationalization of the Nairobi
Secretariat during 2003 now means that SARP has a serious regional partner through which it
can ensure more regional ownership.
Assessment Strategy
The initial project foresaw monitoring and evaluation throughout project implementation, but
there has been little systematic evaluation since mid-2002.
2002. An internal assessment is therefore
long overdue, and a more substantial external evaluation is also considered desirable in view of
2

For the purpose of this project, the Great Lakes Region is defined as all the countries directly involved in the DRC
conflict and the countries that suffer impact of the DRC conflict through refugees, increased cross
cross-border trafficking
and violence.
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political developments in the region. This preliminary assessment will therefore constrain itse
itself to
taking stock of progress achieved and challenges identified so far, and to the development of
terms of reference for a full external evaluation which will assess efficiency and impact and make
recommendations for the future of the project.
Objectives
1)
2)
3)

To conduct a preliminary assessment of the first two years of SARP.
To draft terms of reference for an external evaluation of SARP.
Provide technical advice and assistance for the immediate term.

Output
1)
2)

Preliminary assessment of SARP.
ToRs for an external
nal evaluation of SARP.

Anticipated Activities
The mission will meet officials from the UNDP Country Office, the SARP Project Team, the
Nairobi Secretariat and relevant NGOs, as appropriate.
Mission Composition
Kate Joseph, UNDP/BCPR Regional Liaison Specialist, Geneva
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